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Agencies in Conflict: Overlapping
Agencies and the Legitimacy of the
Administrative Process
Louis J. Sirico, Jr.*
An interest group that is dissatisfied with an agency's policies
may try to limit the adverse effects of the policies by demanding
countervailing conduct from another agency. The widespread dupli-
cation and overlap of agency jurisdiction in the federal bureaucracy
thus creates a "multiagency decisionmaking process," which affords
underrepresented groups the opportunity to mold governmental pol-
icy. In other cases, a statute or regulation may require an agency to
solicit opinions from agencies with overlapping concerns and give
them thoughtful consideration. This arrangement also affords dis-
satisfied interests multiple forums for their arguments.
Because I believe that the interests most commonly associated
with public interest advocacy-for example, racial and ethnic mi-
norities, small retail consumers, people with low incomes, and citi-
zens concerned with the environment-are sorely underrepresented
in the political process, I find great value in multiagency decision-
making. If I found that a single agency consistently made determi-
nations favorable to such groups, I would urge expanding that
agency's exclusive jurisdiction to eliminate duplication and over-
lap.' Such bodies, however, are rare and their policy biases are
transitory. I therefore view multiagency decisionmaking as the best
way to maximize the chances that an underrepresented group's
views will prevail. Though some public planners lament the incon-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School-Camden. B.A., Yale Uni-
versity, 1967; J.D., University of Texas, 1972. Member of the Connecticut and District of
Columbia bars. Donald Leibowitz and Robert M. Purdy, Jr. provided research assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. A related topic is the typical reorganization proposal to consolidate in a single agency
the jurisdiction shared by several agencies. A recent example was the ill-fated proposal to
transfer the Economic Development Administration from the Commerce Department to a
new department that would direct all federal economic development activities. Proponents
argued that the move would make the program more sensitive to the needs of cities. Critics
responded that the program worked well despite its location in a department particularly
sensitive to business rather than urban needs. See Carter Scans Plan on New U.S. Agency,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 1, at 12, col. 1; Dispute Between Two Carter Aides Mires
Economic Development Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1979, at A24, col. 1; President's Stand
on Reorganizing Seen as an Attempt to Compromise, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1979, at All, col.
1. It is thus an understatement to contend that "[rleorganization is shuffling boxes and
moving people around." Drew, Second Phase, NEw YORKER, May 23, 1977, at 123 (quoting
Hamilton Jordan).
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sistency and inefficiency of multiagency decisionmaking, I argue
that these drawbacks are frequently outweighed by the great value
of this process in legitimating the administrative system and ren-
dering it accessible to the widest possible range of diverse interests.
This view of the administrative process does not lend itself well
to traditional academic scholarship. I would likely find it impossible
to reach my conclusions about administrative structures if my re-
sources were limited to scrupulously documented evidence and
value neutral principles, or close facsimiles. Amassing unassailable
evidence would be impossibly difficult and, therefore, logical rea-
soning would fail to construct a safe bridge to such conclusions. As
an alternative, informed assumptions and accepted community val-
ues may be used to reach a wide range of socially useful conclusions,
though at the risk of reduced accuracy.2 As the assumptions and
values become less controversial, however, the conclusions will be-
come more persuasive. Consequently, this Article utilizes common-
place assumptions and values to reach conclusions supporting mul-
tiagency decisionmaking.3 I assume that American society is plural-
istic and, therefore, that American government is characterized by
pressure politics in which competing interest groups vie for influ-
ence-a view shared by most contemporary political scientists.' I
also rely heavily on the conservative value of legitimacy and posit
the need for a more legitimated administrative process.' Legitimacy
is a continuing problem for the administrative system. Uneasiness
2. Depending on the subject of inquiry, several other methods of analysis help overcome
the constraints of "positivist" scholarship. E.g., Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967) (developing and applying jurisprudential principles); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform
and Administrative Law: A StructuralApproach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978) (employing detailed
case studies); Stover & Eckart, A Systematic Comparison of Public Defenders and Private
Attorneys, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 265 (1975) (combining statistical studies with interviews and
field observation); Comment, In Search of the Adversary System-The Cooperative Practices
of Private Criminal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEx. L. REv. 60 (1972) (relying on colorful inter-
views). Whether positivism can produce value free analysis is highly questionable. See, e.g.,
Cohen, The Political Element in Legal Theory: A Look at Kelsen's Pure Theory, 88 YALE L.J.
1 (1978). Its style, however, shapes the direction of legal scholarship and limits its uses.
3. This study is limited to federal agencies, which receive their authority from the
constitutional branches-the Congress, the Executive, and the Federal Judiciary. Much of
the analysis, however, should apply to federal agency-state agency interactions as well.
4. The nontechnical definition of pluralism used here would include within its ambit
the ideas in such contemporaneous works as R. DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1956), and G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
5. An agency's behavior is legitimate if it sufficiently meets the needs of some interests
and does not so antagonize others that it significantly increases the adverse effects of political
discontent. The administrative system enjoys political legitimacy to the extent that its con-
duct minimizes potential polarization and segmentation in society. See text accompanying
notes 37-43 infra.
6. E.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCESS AND AMERI-
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must arise when community values, a loosely constructed scheme
of public law, and the idiosyncrasies of individual decisionmakers
are the only forces constraining the power of competing interest
groups.
This Article demonstrates how multiagency decisionmaking
can enhance the legitimacy of the administrative system. After dis-
cussing the meaning of legitimacy in a highly stable society, it ana-
lyzes multiagency decisionmaking process from the perspective of
the political scientist. I particularly emphasize "partisan mutual
adjustment" analysis, 7 which views the system as adjusting contin-
ually to the conduct of interacting participants. This theory com-
ports not only with the pluralistic, pressure politics model of Ameri-
can government, but also with the methodology of classical econom-
ics, which celebrates the product of competing, conflicting interests.
The Article concludes by demonstrating that the multiagency pro-
cess can increase legitimacy by furthering those constitutional val-
ues that most often call into question an agency's validity. Multi-
agency decisionmaking is not always the best administrative struc-
ture. Its many advantages, however, may frequently make it the
most desirable option.
I. THE NOTION OF LEGITIMACY IN A STABLE SOCIETY
A. Defining Legitimacy
To define political legitimacy in a pluralistic society requires
packing complicated concepts into traditional democratic figures of
speech, all the while hoping that the packages retain their contours
and that the seams do not burst. We generally equate political
legitimacy with political accountability, but this view raises a tell-
ing question-accountability to which interests? Specific govern-
ment conduct rarely satisfies all interests in society, and interest
groups exercise varying degrees of political clout.8 Recognition of
these two important facts permits us to identify two sources of dis-
content with a political system.' The first is the inability of any
CAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 passim (1975); see Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process,
84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975) (agencies lack continuing accountability to the political process);
Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 120 (1977) (study of administrative law has focused on administrative
legitimacy).
7. See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
8. See, e.g., R. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1971); R. DAHL, supra
note 4, at 124-51; G. MCCONNELL, supra note 4.
9. The following analysis derives in part from Dahl, Introduction to REGIMES AND
19801
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government policy to win the approval of all interests involved. The
second is "perceived political inequality"-the belief by some
groups that their interests are inadequately expressed, organized,
and represented. In extreme cases, such feelings of discontent may
foment political upheaval. In the context of our society, they can
foster a political environment infected with dissatisfaction and cyni-
cism, which encourages a narrow struggle to advance special inter-
ests that can immobilize government."0 The contemporary pheno-
menon of single issue politics may illustrate the danger.
In this light, a government system or instrumentality enjoys
political legitimacy to the extent that its conduct minimizes poten-
tial polarization and segmentation in society. This definition re-
flects James Madison's concern about the propensity of societies to
break into factions and the resulting "instability, injustice, and
confusion .. . the mortal diseases under which popular govern-
ments have everywhere perished."" An instance of legitimate con-
duct may evoke a very positive response from some interests and an
accepting response from others, but it may also elicit hostility from
still other interests. Occasionally a government or agency can even
act in a politically illegitimate manner without causing fragmenta-
tion, provided its aggregate behavior falls within the boundaries
defined by those to whom it owes political responsibility.'
2
In the most abstract sense, political accountability is accounta-
bility to the entire society in that a reckoning will draw closer if
OPPOSITIONS 18-25 (R. Dahl ed. 1973).
10. The situation's severity depends on the level of antagonism, the number of sets of
antagonists involved in each conflict, the extent to which the composition of sets of antago-
nists in one conflict is identical with the composition of sets involved in other conflicts (a
high degree of identity reinforces the conflicts), and the extent to which all these factors
persist unchanged over time. Id. at 20-21.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison recog-
nized that a faction could consist of a majority as well as a minority of citizens. Id. at 57.
Factionalism and segmentation continue to concern contemporary observers. For example:
Samuel Huntington, a principal adviser to the National Security Council, warns against
the "excesses" of democracy-the problems of government are too complex to accommo-
date the conflicts inherent in democratic rule. Elsewhere in the world, the collapse of
democratic experiments and the rise of authoritarian iegimes lend support to the in-
creasingly fashionable view that strong rule, not democracy, is the wave of the future.
Barnet, No Room in the Lifeboats, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 33.
12. An arguable illustration is the FCC's 1975 decision to exempt from the equal time
requirement newsworthy debates between political candidates and press conferences by can-
didates, including incumbents. Aspen Institute, 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975), sustained sub nom.
Chisolm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). Though
the circuit court upheld the FCC's statutory authority to make the ruling, the decision was
one that Congress had informally reserved. In the litigation, the television networks supported




conduct undermines the political system's stability. Practically,
however, an agency's behavior enjoys legitimacy if it sufficiently
meets the needs of some interests and does not so antagonize others
that it significantly increases political discontent. 3 Conduct is effi-
cacious if it not only meets this minimal criterion for legitimacy, but
actually reduces the likelihood of political discontent. We can still
employ the convenient shorthand of conventional political conver-
sation and speak of "attending to society's needs, wishes, and de-
mands," but only if we recognize the intricate meaning of that
phrase."
B. The Sources of Administrative Legitimacy
The legitimacy of administrative activity has long been a
source of controversy. 15 The discussion has traditionally focused on
three issues-(1) the extent of Congressional power to delegate au-
thority, (2) the nature of judicial review, and (3) the fairness of
13. Herbert Simon's notion of "satisficing" is a kindred concept. See H. SIMON, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxviii-xxxi, 38-41, 80-81, 240-44, 272 (3d ed. 1976). Also related is Pareto
economic analysis. For a brief description, see B. ACKERMAN, Introduction to ECONOMIC FOUN-
DATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv (1975). An agency's limited options may preclude it from
choosing the alternative that would maximize an interest group's satisfaction. Maximization
might consist only of reflecting the group's preference among available choices. To the extent
that the group proves successful in persuading an agency to select the preferred available
option it obtains the satisfaction of exercising some control over its own destiny. Cf. Lane,
Markets and the Satisfaction of Human Wants, 4 J. ECON. IssuEs 799, 821-22 (1978) (a market
economy's best defense may be its ability, within limits, to enhance the individual's sense of
control, rather than its occasional ability to maximize satisfaction). An unacceptably narrow
range of choices, however, undermines legitimacy. Professor Bickel phrases the definition
well:
[Llegitimacy comes to a regime that is felt to be good and to have proven itself as such
to generations past as well as in the present. Such a government must be principled as
well as responsible; but it must be felt to be the one without having ceased to be the
other, and unless it is responsible it cannot in fact be stable, and is not in my view
morally supportable.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 29(1962).
14. "There is an accuracy that defeats itself by the over-emphasis of details. . . The
sentence may be so overloaded with all its possible qualifications that it will tumble down of
its own weight." B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 7 (1931).
15. See notes 5-6 supra. Dean Freedman argues that threats to administrative legiti-
macy stem from agency failure to conform to the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers, departure from judicial norms, public ambivalence toward economic regulation, con-
cerns with bureaucratization, skepticism of administrative expertise, the lack of direct politi-
cal accountability, and problems arising from broad delegations of legislative power. J.
FREEDMAN, supra note 6. He identifies four sources of administrative legitimacy-the process'
indispensability to the governmental scheme, its elements of political accountability, its
effectiveness in meeting statutory responsibilities, and public perception of fair decisionmak-
ing procedures. He emphasizes procedural fairness as an essential source. My approach insists
on the primacy of perceived political and public accountability, but, as the Article demon-
strates, incorporates into this notion an awareness of these other concerns.
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formal agency procedure. The first two deal with accountability to
the constitutional branches, and the third questions whether the
agency conducts its affairs in a politically acceptable manner and
whether it is accessible to affected interest groups."
Critics of the administrative system frequently complain that
the tools of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches have
proven inadequate to ensure its political accountability.'7 Such
statements may embody two criticisms-first, the constitutional
branches in fact lack sufficiently effective tools of control; second,
even if they were equipped with satisfactory tools, the branches
would advance policies that inadequately reflect what society deems
to be politically acceptable.
Our system deepens the discontent on both counts by relying
heavily on the judicial branch as the primary direct check on the
daily conduct of administrative agencies. The courts' powers pre-
vent them from doing more than stopping arbitrary conduct and
conduct that violates specific legislative, executive, and constitu-
tional directives. A question of political legitimacy limits the pro-
priety of more extensive judicial review by the least democratic
branch. The only two political checks on the courts are limited and
indirect. First, political legitimacy depends on the executive and
Congressional powers of judicial appointment and on the legislative
power to define the limits of judicial authority. The courts' other
16. The recent broadening of standing and growth of participatory rights in agency
proceedings suggests that the traditional administrative model is giving way to a legislative
model-a surrogate political process in which a wide range of affected interests enjoy the
opportunity to participate. See Stewart, supra note 6. This legislative mode may be the result
of broad delegation of power to agencies, since the political pressures that once focused on
Congress must now focus increasingly on the administrative system. See Gellhorn & Robin-
son, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 778 (1975). The rulemaking
proceeding is the most apparent parallel to the legislative process. See, e.g., Nelson, The
Politicization of FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413 (1976). The model, however, looks to
interest group participation through formal agency proceedings and relies on the courts for
implementation. In this Article, I emphasize that interest groups influence agencies through
the larger political process as well as by the threat of formal judicial review. See Stewart,
supra note 6, at 1670 n.5, 1687; notes 127-42 infra and accompanying text.
17. E.g., Cutler & Johnson, supra note 6 (proposing as a remedy the now-current pro-
posal for a Congressional veto over agency rulemakings); President Asserts He Won't Feel
Bound by Congress Vetoes, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1978, at Al, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Jim Wright
(D. Tex.)):
Increasingly in recent years, there has been a voracious thirst on the part of nonelected
bureaucrats to write regulations that have the force and effect of law, without the
inconvenience of running for Congress. . . . [The very possibility of a legislative veto]
should serve as a brake on the overzealous administrator.
The American Bar Association recently endorsed a proposal to grant the President lim-
ited power to review critical agency regulations and to grant Congress some form of review
over such presidential actions. ABA Annual Meeting, 48 U.S.L.W. 2134 (Aug. 21, 1979).
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source of political legitimacy is the Constitution, which articulates
the basic political structure to which society has assented. Conse-
quently, the primary check on the administrative system issues
from the branch of government most distant from the ultimate
source of political validation-the people. This remoteness rational-
izes authorizing only limited judicial power to check the discretion
of administrative agencies, which are themselves remote from the
ultimate source of political legitimacy.'"
Though the three constitutional branches are the formal instru-
ments for bounding administrative discretion, no agency can rely
entirely on official definitions of politically legitimate behavior. For
example, it has no guarantee that a Congressional directive accur-
ately reflects society's perceived needs. The stability of government
may require that overall legislative policy approximate society's
priorities in the long run, but an agency has no assurance that any
single statutory provision, or a series of them, enjoys full political
legitimacy at any given time. Moreover, the directive may reflect
priorities that have become outdated since its enactment.'" Thus, if
an agency permits its discretion free run within the bounds of offi-
cially imposed constraints, it may risk its political legitimacy.
The risk grows when an agency enjoys exceedingly broad discre-
tion to determine what the public interest mandates, because it
does not know how the politically accountable branches would de-
cide specific cases.2" The broad delegation of power, which may
result both from Congressional reluctance to face controversial is-
sues and from a thoughtful decision to sacrifice close control for
administrative versatility and flexibility limits the agency's ability
to effectively cite higher authority. To the extent that Congress
relies on broad delegation to avoid controversy or to delay dealing
with the matter, it creates a time bomb that an agency may find
18. The limited judicial check on administrative discretion does not automatically
trigger itself. Though standing and due process safeguards have been expanded recently,
potential litigants frequently lack the resources to invoke them. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA
217-31 (1976). Despite such recent retrenchments as Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), however, the rights of
underrepresented groups have advanced considerably since Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), and Office of
Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 6, at 1407. Though legislative oversight hearings
may alert the agency to changes in Congressional attitude, the signals come not from the
entire body but from committees and subcommittees, which are often dominated by a few
individuals.
20. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 17; Freedman, supra note 6, at 1048 (the loss of the




difficult to defuse.2' The agency thus has an important task in per-
suading society that its course is sound. 2
An agency must seek political legitimacy from two sources-the
constitutional branches, which reflect societal priorities only indi-
rectly, and society itself. Citizens generally rely upon the three con-
stitutional branches to prescribe legitimate behavior for the agen-
cies and to enforce their prescriptions. Nongovernment expressions
of societal wishes are highly inarticulate. If a serious disparity arises
between the government prescription and society's preferred pre-
scription, the constitutional branches will feel pressure to direct
agencies to alter their conduct. Societal interests, however, will also
directly pressure the agencies to undertake their own reformation
before the government branches impose more drastic changes."
An agency faces a dilemma when its reading of societal priori-
ties conflicts with specific directives from any of the three constitu-
tional branches. Failure, for example, to comply with a Congres-
sional policy may jeopardize an agency's well-being, but compliance
may impair legitimacy. If the legislative mandate is not too con-
strictive, a balancing may be possible. The deregulation of commer-
cial air rates offers an illustration. The Civil Aeronautics Board
began pursuing deregulation even as Congress found itself unable to
insure prompt passage of deregulation legislation. Yet the Board's
policies seemed to find great support within the Executive branch,
with at least some of the airlines, and among the general public.
Though some in Congress grumbled about deregulation "by the
back door," the agency sensed enough general support to take up
its new course. Perceived societal priorities outweighed any impair-
ment of legitimacy with Congress. 24
21. See Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 585-86 (1972). The Executive parallel
to broad delegation and narrow judicial review is noninvolvement in regulatory affairs. An
active role promises limited political gains at best. See Robinson, On Reorganizing the Inde-
pendent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REv. 947, 953 n.18 (1971). It also invites charges of
excessive interference in the regulatory process. See, e.g., Some in EPA Assail White House
Moves, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1979, at Al, col. 2.
22. Invoking agency expertise is a common method of persuasion, though its effective-
ness seems to be diminishing. See Freedman, supra note 6, at 1051-56; Stewart, supra note
6, at 1684-87. Conflict resolution often does not depend solely on technical determinations.
Even when expert opinion strongly suggests a particular solution, the agency may lack the
political muscle to implement it successfully. See L. JAFFE, JuDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AcTION 50-51 (1965).
23. The establishment of agency consumer assistance offices, for example, has been
attributed not only to consumerist pressure, but also to the desire to deflect the threat of a
legislatively established, aggressive consumer advocacy program. See, e.g., Ford Consumer
Plans Denounced, Defended, 34 CONG. Q. 575 (1976).
24. See CAB Unveils Plan for Deregulation of Air-Fare Cuts, N.Y. Times, April 15,
1978, at 1, col. 3.
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C. Administrative Legitimacy and Interest Group Advocacy
It is commonplace that many agencies are excessively solici-
tous of one regulatee at the expense of another regulatee, a competi-
tor of the favored regulatee, or the ultimate consumer. Where such
favoritism exists, the neglected interests may well feel underrepre-
sented; they may voice their concerns themselves or rely on a sym-
pathetic public official or agency. The political system employs two
primary remedies for underrepresentation. First, it may mandate
that an existing agency revise its jurisdictional responsibilities in
order to give greater weight to allegedly neglected interests. The
mandate might direct an agency to exercise authority over a new
party or practice," to shuffle the weights it assigns to various consid-
erations in reaching a decision, 2 or even to weigh considerations
hitherto ignored.Y The political branches might also indirectly alter
the might of various interests by increasing the resources of tradi-
tionally underrepresented interests. Attorneys' fees for public inter-
est participants and offices of consumer protection 2 are examples.
Second, Congress and the Executive may create entirely new agen-
cies to meet the concerns of emerging interests. Agencies flowing
from the War on Poverty0 are a recent example.
Combinations of the two approaches are possible when a new
agency signals the growing force of a previously represented interest.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency3 began as a
consolidation of authority previously parceled out to numerous
agencies, and the Department of Energy32 collected new and recon-
25. E.g., Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (mandating stricter regulation of drugs, drug advertising, and
drug manufacture); see M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 102-09 (1975) (recounting the
pharmaceutical industry's success in weakening the final legislation).
26. E.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)(15), 309(b) (1976), construed in ICC v. J-T Transport Co.,
368 U.S. 81 (1961) (criteria for granting permits to contract carrier motor vehicles).
27. E.g., Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-05 (West Supp.
1979) (when examining a financial institution or evaluating its application for a deposit
facility, a federal regulator must consider the institution's record in meeting the credit needs
of the local community).
28. E.g., Maguuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, § 202(h), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976) (reimbursement of expenses to certain participants
in rulemaking proceedings).
29. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 26b (1976) (establishing an Office of Rail Public Counsel within
the Rail Services Planning Office of the ICC). For a critical analysis of methods to increase
consumer participation and a new proposal designed to meet the deficiencies of existing
methods, see Leflar & Rogol, Consumer Participation in the Regulation of Public Utilities:
A Model Act, 13 HARv. J. LEGis. 235 (1976).
30. See D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 61-101 (1969).
31. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. app., at 1725-30 (1976).
32. Exec. Order No. 12,009, 3 C.F.R. 142 (1977 Compilation) (implementing Depart-
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structed agencies within a single cabinet department.
Even when the administrative structure requires agencies to
attend to at least the more significant societal interests, complaints
of inadequate representation may still arise. A practical cure, how-
ever, may not always be readily available. Inadequate representa-
tion stems from maldistribution of resources among participants.
Resources 33 include power, weight, and influence; 34 competence rele-
vant to the issue; possession of information relevant to the issue;
analytical resources; and bargaining and persuasion skills. An inter-
est group may lack adequate resources, or the agencies upon which
it depends for representation may suffer similar deprivation. For
present purposes, we emphasize the ways in which inadequate rep-
resentation may be ameliorated by altering agency structures, man-
dates, practices, and resources. We must also assume that the dis-
tribution of resources is not so disparate that legitimacy is nonexis-
tent or beyond ready reach. Reallocating power and perceptions of
deserved power among societal interests is too ambitious a task.
An underlying question remains: how do we determine that an
interest lacks adequate representation? If our present concern were
pursuit of the democratic ideal, we might maintain that all interests
should enjoy equal representation and wield equal political clout.
From the perspective of legitimacy, however, it is not necessary to
weigh particular complaints of inadequate representation against a
philosophical standard of equal representation. If interest groups
perceive the system as legitimate, they implicitly conclude that its
process and results do not exclude their particular concerns to an
intolerable degree. They are therefore willing to accept something
less than equal representation. For some groups, legitimacy may
mean only that the system gives them a realistic possibility of fur-
thering their specific concerns. We therefore emphasize the percep-
tions that various interests actually have about their respective de-
grees of representation.
A particular interest may point to a number of criteria to dem-
onstrate inadequate representation. It may declare that an interest
with so powerful a role in society deserves greater consideration in
the political process, but a low income group, for example, may feel
powerless in society and still perceive itself as politically under-
represented. Its perception may be shaped by an ideal that assigns
ment of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (Aug. 4, 1977) (codified in
scattered sections of 3, 5, 7, 12, 15, 42 U.S.C.)).
33. This definition of resources derives from George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy
in Making Foreign Policy, 66 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REV. 751, 759 (1972).
34. See id. at 759 n.33.
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power in proportion to votes. Alternatively, it may assume that the
size of a group's voice should be based on the merits of its position.
The group might also argue for greater political influence because
society should exercise a general solicitousness toward powerless
minorities. Sorting out these arguments would likely prove to be
time consuming and fruitless, because different groups base their
perceptions upon different presumptions concerning the nature of
underrepresentation.
We adopt a more neutral approach-that government should
attune itself to perceptions of inadequate representation. From the
viewpoint of legitimacy, uneasiness should arise when a dissatisfied
interest is powerful enough to impair the system's legitimacy. The
perceived threat to legitimacy depends on the extent of the inter-
est's power and the intensity of its perception of inadequate repre-
s'entation.
According to this analysis decisionmakers in federal agencies
should consider the positions of significant societal interests. An
agency, however, need not act as if it were a trade association for
its regulatees. It should screen the arguments of regulatees, compet-
itors, and consumers through a public interest filter and consider
such values as economically efficient resource allocation, social
equality, distribution of wealth, moral principles, and duties to na-
ture .35 To the extent that the process gives attention to the concerns
of underrepresented and unrepresented interests, including future
generations, it enhances legitimacy.36 Deliberation may lead the
agency to make a determination contrary to all the arguments
placed before it. At a minimum, however, the process should insure
participating groups access to a listening ear and a voice in the
ultimate decision. This fact in itself would enhance the legitimacy
of the process.
The question remains, however, whether administrative consid-
eration is enough to deflect challenges to legitimacy. If an agency
bombards an interest with consistently hostile responses, the inter-
est will not retain a passive demeanor. Interests expect to prevail,
at least occasionally. If an agency is dealing fairly with interest
advocates and remains open to their concerns, however, the inter-
35. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 97-116, 163-97 (2d ed.
1978).
36. President Franklin Roosevelt described the federal regulatory agency as a "tribune
of the people." HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, H.R. Doc.
No. 134, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REGULATORY REFORM
STUDY]. By giving weight to the public interest, the agency remedies some deficiencies in the
legislative model of administrative activity. See note 16 supra.
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ests can reasonably expect some victories. If the significance of these
victories is sufficient to provide appropriate satisfaction and allay
serious dissatisfaction, the agency assures its legitimacy. Thus, an
agency should not play special interest advocate. It should be sensi-
tive to the needs of the interests with which it regularly deals; and
it should employ that sensitivity not only in its own decisions, but
in multiagency determinations in which it participates.
Participation by multiple agencies in the decisionmaking pro-
cess even in the point of interagency conflict, can frequently assist
the administrative system in gaining political legitimacy. Adminis-
trative bodies other than the agency principally engaged in making
a decision (the "focal agency") present additional reflections on
societal priorities and also additional indirect expressions of those
priorities by the politically accountable branches of government.
Moreover, aggregate administrative policy-the sum total of the
decisions of all federal agencies-may also demonstrate a deeper
understanding of those priorities. The process checks the formal
system's Procrustean proclivity to ignore societal conflicts in hopes
of furthering temporal efficiency.
IX. THE DYNAMIC OF MULTIAGENcY DECISIONMAKING
The redundancy of multiple agency activity breeds conflict.
Duplicated efforts and inconsistent, overlapping results create tem-
poral inefficiency that can frustrate an interest group's demand for
speedy gratification. Similarly, the multiagency process can discon-
cert a group that has the ear of one key agency, but not of the others.
The political and substantive aspects of the resulting decisions,
however, may receive more thorough consideration, and the deci-
sions may therefore prove more lasting. Because the interests of
more groups receive consideration, the final result may enjoy
broader acceptability and therefore enhanced legitimacy.
The circumstances of each case determine the appropriate bal-
ance between temporal efficiency and the benefits of multiple
agency participation. A preoccupation with short run efficiency in-
duces an inappropriate striking of the balance. This preoccupation
may arise when the benefits of a redundant system remain unclear.
This section of this Article examines these benefits. It analyzes the
nature of administrative conflict, the policies that result from exces-
sive aversion to conflict, and the positive aspects of multiple agency
activity.
A. Types of Administrative Conflict
The potential for conflict arises when one agency can interfere
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with another agency's efforts to pursue its policy goals. The types
of conflict can be systematically organized on a continuum with
three modes-blockage, policy interference, and advocacy.
At one end of the spectrum is concrete conflict, or blockage,
where one agency's conduct can block the specific effect of another
agency's policy. In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research
Group, 3, for example, environmentalists unsuccessfully argued that
both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Environmental
Protection Agency could independently set standards for certain
radioactive emissions from atomic power plants. The case illustrates
that the possibility of blockage might sometimes produce beneficial
effects. Here, the suggested arrangement would have fostered a cau-
tious approach on public health and safety by subjecting the nuclear
industry to the stricter of the two agency standards. Moreover, the
threat that the other agency might take the more exacting stance
and acquire a decisionmaking monopoly might have encouraged
negotiation and thoughtful exchange.18
At the middle of the spectrum, one agency may interfere with
another agency's implementation of a chosen policy without com-
pletely negating it. Banking agencies, for example, might adhere to
different policies in ruling on mergers by financial institutions. The
lenient agency's policies might spur dissatisfied regulatees of the
restrictive agency to reclassify themselves so that they would then
fall within the jurisdiction of the more accommodating regulator.
The restrictive agency's policy would then lose effectiveness to the
extent that the competing policy triggered defections by regulatees
and created discontent among those who could not defect. The in-
jured agency could restore power and legitimacy by abandoning its
policy or by persuading higher authorities to testrict the offending
agency's power to interfere."
37. 426 U.S. 1 (1976). See also Schwartz, Protecting Consumer Health and Safety: The
Need for Coordinated Regulation Among Federal Agencies, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1071
n.260 (1975) (conflict between Food and Drug Administration and Environmental Protection
Agency over permissible levels of a pesticide residue in food products); Scott, The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1977)
(Federal Reserve Board and Comptroller issuing contrary rulings on the types of bonds issua-
ble by state banks that are Federal Reserve members). In a recent, curious case of potential
blockage, the FCC claimed that its jurisdiction reaches the U.S. Postal Service's electronic
mail service. According to the FCC, the federal agency is its regulatee. Electronic Mail Rift,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1979, at D1, col. 4.
38. If an agency fears blocking action by another agency, it may choose to do nothing
but wait to see what the latter agency decides. See Strauss, The NRC Role and Plant Siting,
4 J. CONTEMP. L. 96, 97 (1977). Agencies frequently avoid conflict by agreements that divide
overlapping jurisdiction. See note 94 infra.
39. See Scott, supra note 37 (examining the impact of differing merger and other poli-
cies on banking regulators and regulatees). The ability of a regulatee to shift from one
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Finally, one agency may employ advocacy to battle another
agency's policy. For example, sometimes a regulatory agency's ap-
proval can immunize a merger or other industrial reorganization
from attack under the antitrust laws." In such instances, the Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department may be able to contest the
transaction only by voicing its opposition in the relevant agency
proceeding.' If the agency avoids legal improprieties in reaching its
decision, the Division's advocacy can go no further. The focal
agency, of course, may have good reason to give substantial weight
to the Division's position. In addition to according deference to an
important government body, the agency may wish to avoid creating
ill feelings. It may rely on Justice to represent it in judicial proceed-
ings,4 2 and it may also fear that an antagonized Antitrust Division
will intensify scrutiny of agency activity in search of questionable
conduct that is not immune from antitrust attack.43
Redundancy thus may arise because agencies exercise concur-
rent jurisdiction over parties or because they concurrently pursue a
general or specific policy. The resulting conflicts may be products
of intentional or unintentional design, but their origins in conflict-
ing delegations of authority enable the agency to attribute the loss
of temporal efficiency to the political branches. For Congress and
the Executive, the extent and nature of administrative conflict raise
questions about the manner in which an administrative system
should be designed. Because provisions for duplication of tasks and
jurisdictional overlap build in conflict, the designing options range
from a nonredundant unitary model to a redundant multiagency
model.
agency's jurisdiction to another's can induce regulators to engage in "competition in laxity."
Keeffe & Head, What is Wrong with the American Banking System and What to Do About
It, 36 MD. L. REv. 788, 798 (1977)(quoting former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur
Burns).
40. E.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (im-
munity of certain sales and distribution practices of open-end management companies regu-
lated by the SEC); Motor Carriers Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 559 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978)(ICC has power to set conditions for granting immun-
ity to rate bureau agreements); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 30(a),
92 Stat. 1731 (1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. 1384 (1976) (authorizing CAB to grant immunity
when "required in the public interest")).
41. The Justice Department also participates in administrative proceedings when an
agency cannot bestow antitrust immunity. Since the mid-1960s, it has viewed this activity
as a regular part of its role in implementing antitrust policy. See Kauper, Competition Policy
and the Institutions of Antitrust, 23 S.D.L. REv. 1, 22-26 (1978).
42. See id. at 25 n.54.
43. The Division, in turn, may temper its criticism to maintain good relations with its
client agency and to check any feeling that the agency should seek authority to do its own
litigating. Participation in administrative proceedings may also broaden Justice's perceptions
of the marketplace and public policy. Id. at 25-26.
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B. The Unitary Model and the Bias Against Redundancy
The unitary or synoptic model grants each agency complete
autonomy, but deprives it of any authority beyond sharply drawn
jurisdictional lines. The highly centralized agencies interact only
linearly; one agency performs its task and relies on another agency
to perform a related but nonconflicting second task. Coordination
and planning are the tools for avoiding conflict and assuring tem-
poral efficiency. Lack of rationality and poor communications are
the sources of inefficiency. The unitary model presumes that each
agency is fully responsive to societal needs and is perfectible to the
point that improvident decisions will be rare." Just as redundant
systems in natural organisms-for example, neural systems45-seek
to assure survival, zero redundancy in public administration pre-
sumes survival 4 -that is, legitimacy.
Synoptic thinking results in huge agencies or cabinet depart-
ments that struggle to coordinate the policies and practices of their
respective components. These centralized structures occasion risks
of limited accountability and weak coordination among compo-
nents; they also create the danger that dissenting views will lack the
opportunity to prove their merits. Moreover, the unitary model fails
to acknowledge the nature of the administrative system. Agencies
are focal points for coordinating and controlling complex sets of
tasks that are categorized according to topic (such as airlines, sur-
face transportation, food and drugs) and function (such as antitrust,
trade regulation, and environmental protection)." Overlaps are in-
evitable. Conflicts arise in part because of mechanical inefficiency
and poor communication, but the serious conflicts stem from a lack
of consensus on national policy. 8 No amount of coordination or
agency consolidation can eliminate the latter problem. The synoptic
solution merely suppresses it in hopes the disagreement is noncon-
44. Professor Martin Landau draws an analogy to a house that is wired in series. He
suggests that the need for perfection in all the system's parts compels the bureaucracy to
adhere rigidly to regulations and to discourage discretion and other adaptive responses lest
deviation from the rules result in system failure. Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the
Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PuB. AD. REV. 346, 354 (1969).
45. Id. at 351 and sources cited therein. Information theory offers similar analogies. Id.
at 349-51, 353. In both biological and information theory, error and failure have objective
definitions; therefore, the value of redundancy lends itself to more definite measurement than
in political contexts.
46. See Hlavacek & Thompson, Bureaucracy and New Product Innovation, 16 ACAD.
OF MANAGEMENT J. 361, 363 (1973).
47. See P. SELF, ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES AND POLITICS 77-85 (1973); Murane, SEC,
FTC, and the Federal Bank Regulators: Emerging Problems of Administrative Jurisdictional
Overlap, 61 GEO. L.J. 37 (1972).
48. See Jaffe, Foreword to J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, xx-xxi (1966).
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troversial enough to remain suppressed. Because of the inevitability
of overlap and conflict, the truly unitary model would consist of a
single agency comprising the entire administrative system as a sur-
rogate for the constitutional branches.
A possible "mixed system" alternative is the multiple advocacy
model.49 According to this model the unitary decisionmaker would
consider various options presented by advocates from different parts
of the administrative system as well as by outside partisans. As
manager of the policy system, the decisionmaker would also insure
that advocates present a sufficient range of policy alternatives, that
advocates have sufficient resources with no great disparities among
them, and that there is otherwise fair competition among advocates.
The multiple advocacy model, however, could be classified as a type
of centralized decisionmaking that reflects the internal organization
of a single agency. As applied to multiagency activity, the model
would still leave ultimate authority in the hands of a unitary policy-
maker, which merely consults with advocates in a highly structured
setting. Equalization of resources would seem possible only for in-
house advocates. Yet to the extent that other agencies overlap with
the synoptic decisionmaker, potential conflict arises and the redun-
dant multiagency model emerges. Depending on the specifics of the
case, therefore, a mixed model lends itself to classification in either
of the two polar categories.
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act 0
(NEPA) offers an illustration of the "mixed system" model. Under
the statute, the federal official responsible for issuing an environ-
mental impact statement must consult with federal agencies pos-
sessing pertinent jurisdiction or expertise and obtain comments
from them.5' The interagency contact is designed to insure a sound
final product and reduce differences of opinion over the final state-
ment.52 The lead agency, which has the primary responsibility for
49. The model is proposed in George, supra note 33.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
51. The statutory provision calls for the comments and views of "appropriate Federal,
State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental stan-
dards . . . ." Id. Council on Environmental Quality guidelines also oblige the focal or lead
agency to invite participation by affected government bodies and Indian tribes, the proponent
of the action, and other interested persons. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,993 (1978) (to be codified in 40
C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1)). The guidelines provide for comment from these sources both during
and after the drafting process. Id. at 55,993-98 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 99 1501.6,
1501.7, 1502.19, 1503.1-1503.4). It remains unclear whether Council guidelines bind federal
agencies. 2 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.03[1], at 8-160 to -61 (2d ed. 1978). The Council
holds that it issues regulatory mandates pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg.
26,967 (1977). 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,991 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3).
52. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1).
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preparing the statement, assumes certain managerial responsibili-
ties in its consultation with other interested agencies. It plainly
lacks, however, the full power of a manager in the mixed system
model, most notably the power to allocate resources among partici-
pants. Despite the exaltation of cooperation in the statute and im-
plementing guidelines, NEPA actually prescribes a unitary model
that entrusts all ultimate decisions to the lead agency. This fact
perhaps contributes to the general feeling that most interagency
comments are just so much paper. 53 Though lack of diligence of the
lead agency in soliciting and considering other viewpoints has gener-
ated critical note,5 courts have not required deference to criticism
from other agencies. 5 The autonomy of the focal agency may well
encourage the judicial practice of finding compliance when only
minimal consultation has taken place."
Under the "mixed system" model, an agency can occasionally
generate sufficient political pressure to force a rewrite of the impact
statement. Success may result because of a compellingly persuasive
interagency comment. More likely, however, the challenging agency
will rely on its power in the political arena to support its written
contribution to the form NEPA process. In the political context, the
two agencies will expend effort on the same issue, pursue their re-
spective conflicting interests, and reach an adjustment. NEPA's
mixed or unitary system thus gives way to the multiagency model.
The Council on Environmental Quality's role in interagency
review offers another perspective of the mixed system model. The
Council prescribes procedural regulations and recommends resolu-
tions to disputes over environmental impact statements, 57 but lacks
53. I gather this impression from my conversations with those active in environmental
concerns. See notes 53, 54, 55 infra; cf. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,983, 55,985 (1978) (bulky impact
statements are often not even read by decisionmakers).
54. E.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 1245, 1252-53 (D.D.C. 1977);
cf. Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375, 1380-81 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (finding noncompliance with
NEPA as read in conjunction with the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958).
55. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 993 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g and remanding
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
56. E.g., Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 474 & n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Columbia Basin
Land Protection Ass'n. v. Kleppe, 417 F. Supp. 46, 52 (E.D. Wash. 1976); Simmans v. Grant,
370 F. Supp. 5, 18-19 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (finding noncompliance, but permitting the record of
the court hearing to substitute largely for the Army Corps of Engineers' inadequate environ-
mental record). But see Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1123 (E.D.
La. 1977) (impact statement by Army Corps of Engineers was legally inadequate and Corps
consultation with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was infrequent and unproductive); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps. of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 757-58 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(impact statement was deficient, in part because of failure to satisfy requirement for inter-
agency review).
57. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,993, 55,998-99 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5(e),
1504.1-04.3); see note 51 supra.
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decisional authority to evaluate an impact statement's legal ade-
quacy. The Council thus enjoys some managerial power and some
power in shaping the substantive decision, but it falls far short of
being a unitary decisionmaker or mixed system manager. The
Council, however, can exert considerable influence on the decisions
of focal agencies. In 1975, for example, the Council criticized an
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) draft impact statement that
discussed the consequences of permitting light water nuclear reac-
tors to use plutonium as fuel. The Council argued that the AEC's
analysis failed to consider fully the measures necessary to safeguard
plutonium from theft and to assess the civil liberties questions that
the measures might raise. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
which succeeded the AEC, agreed not to license support facilities
for a plutonium recycling industry until it completed a final impact
statement addressing these concerns. The Council could wield this
power because of its prestige and its reputation for opposing impact
statements only where critical flaws exist8
These illustrations demonstrate not only the elusiveness of the
mixed system model, but also the difficulty of maintaining a unitary
system except in a narrow formal sense. Yet the interagency con-
sultation built into the NEPA process deserves some favorable rec-
ognition. As a mechanism for helping the unitary agency make a
sound decision, it gives access to diverse arguments and realizes
other salutary benefits of the multiagency model. By notifying agen-
cies of impending action, which they might oppose, it improves the
chances that agency interaction will enjoy full play. Interagency
review thus does not conform to the multiagency model, but its
contribution toward that model permits its recognition as a process
that bolsters legitimacy." At the same time it has limitations. Inter-
agency coordination committees have not acquired a reputation for
success. Differences in agency positions, idiosyncratic methodolo-
gies, and relative power often frustrate grand compromises."
58. See R. NADER & J. ABoT's, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 280-81 (1977); 6 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 150 (May 16, 1975); Telephone interview with John Abbotts, co-author of THE
MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY, supra. (May 16, 1978).
59. Regulations also permit "teams" of federal, state or local agencies which must
include at least one federal agency, to act as lead agency in preparing an impact statement.
43 Fed. Reg. 55,993 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(b)). This approach incorpo-
rates much of the multiagency process in a highly formalized structure. The Endangered
Species Committee, see 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West Supp. 1979), illustrates a similar incorpora-
tion. The committee includes cabinet level officers and representatives of states where a
disputed development project is located. The body determines whether or not to exempt a
project from the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1976), which is designed to
preserve endangered plants and animals.
60. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION (REGu-
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Though a unitary system seems unattainable from a practical
viewpoint, many continue to propose it as a worthy goal. They in-
clude authors of numerous government reports advocating an ad-
ministrative system devoid of duplication and overlap.' Only the
recent Study on Federal Regulation by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs deviates from the unitary model and ac-
knowledges that "a certain degree of 'redundancy' is not only natu-
ral, but also necessary for sound regulatory administration. 62 The
conclusion is used to justify independent regulatory commissions
that are free from executive control. The study's practical applica-
tions are twofold: it approves the independent status of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission within the Department of Energy,63
and it defends dual antitrust enforcement by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
against the recurring recommendation to entrust Justice with sole
jurisdiction. 4 The suspicion therefore arises that the study's
drafters cared less about the benefits of redundancy than about
championing the cause of independent agencies that are more re-
sponsive to Congress than to the Executive.65
The popularity of synoptic thinking in government circles
should not be surprising. The unitary model's rationality appeals to
officials who bear primary responsibility for structuring the admin-
istrative system. The synoptic approach implies that conflicts in the
LATORY ORGANIZATION), S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY]; P. SELF, supra note 47, at 106; Cutler & Johnson,
supra note 6, at 1406 n.38.
61. E.g., S. Res. 71, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 13,805 (1975); HousE REGULA-
TORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 36, at 4, 487-503; J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 24-30, 74-81 (1960), reprinted in LEGIS. REF. SERVICE OF LIB. OF CONG.,
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS, S. Doc.
No. 49, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1301, 1330-36, 1380-87 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LANDIS
REPORT1; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUrIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 5-7 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as ASH REPORT]. One recent product of such thinking is the Regulatory Council, which
was formed by several federal agencies and designed to hold down the cost of regulation. It
admits its lack of success in eliminating duplicative and overlapping regulations. Wall St.
J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
62. SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 6.
63. Id. at 10, 77-78.
64. Id. at 229-60.
65. The study emphasizes the distinction between executive agencies and independent
regulatory commissions. As might be expected in a Congressional study, the latter format
receives warm endorsement. See id. at 25-81. The Ash Report, supra note 61, displays a
contrary bias. See Robinson, supra note 21 (rejecting Ash Report proposals for increased
Presidential control over independent commissions). The controversy over independent agen-




system are defects for which cures are available. To admit that
extrarational forces dominate the system is to admit lack of control.
The existence of logical solutions means that officials potentially
have sufficient means for directing their agencies to act in an or-
derly, efficient manner. The only obstacles are inertia, special inter-
ests that exploit existing defects, and recalcitrant decisionmakers
who fail to understand the problem. Synoptic thinking implies that
decisionmakers can live up to their perceived responsibilities and
maintain their legitimacy.
On their face, judicial rules of statutory construction do not
disfavor duplication and overlap of administrative jurisdiction."
Courts readily uphold jurisdictional redundancies when legislative
history documents such a Congressional intent . 7 Courts, however,
dislike basing major change on implication." Thus, where sanction-
ing duplication would significantly alter a pervasive regulatory
scheme, judges usually require a clear indication of legislative in-
tent.69 In practice, therefore, an agency claiming a new but ambigu-
ous statutory mandate or one it has only recently invoked may face
a stumbling block. It must show that it clearly holds concurrent
jurisdiction if another agency enjoys an older statutory mandate
and conducts a pervasive regulatory operation. The presumption
thus favors the nonduplicative status quo.70
In one curious line of cases some federal courts have utilized the
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent agency
action against a party whose conduct already has triggered action
by another agency. The underlying rationale presumes a truly uni-
tary government, in that the first agency acts as privy for the second
agency when it determines the issues fundamental to the latter
agency's proceeding. 7' In practice, however, these courts apply the
66. E.g., NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 672-74 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (recog-
nizing the Congressional prerogative, but expressing distaste for diffused administrative re-
sponsibility).
67. E.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
68. E.g., Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 265-66 (1975); Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974).
69. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 24 (1976).
70. See id.
71. The cases cite as authority Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381
(1940), in which the National Bituminous Coal Commission found that a coal producer was
eligible for membership in the Bituminous Coal Code, under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.
Eligible producers who failed to join were subject to a 19/2% excise tax, to be collected by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. According to the Court, the Commissioner could treat
as res judicata the Commission's finding that the producer was eligible and therefore subject
to the tax. The Court declared that the Commissioner was "merely the agency to collect taxes
levied under the Act . . . . [and was] given no administrative functions whatsoever except
tax collection." Id. at 401-02. The case therefore does not necessarily hold that all government
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doctrine only in very limited circumstances." The more contempo-
rary judicial viewpoint recognizes that "a court should approach
gingerly a claim that one agency has conclusively determined an
issue later analyzed from another perspective by an agency with
different substantive jurisdiction."7 3 The unitary system, therefore,
enjoys continued vitality as a policy goal. It attracts the eye of
public planners and receives a neutral and sometimes favorable
reception from the courts.
C. The Multiagency Process
Despite current disfavor, the value of redundancy and potential
conflict in our political system was evident to the founding fathers.
The federalism principle,74 the bicameral legislature,7 5 and the sepa-
agencies act in privity with one another. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
In the typical case, either the FTC or FDA has taken action against misrepresentations
concerning a drug. The FTC has jurisdiction over misrepresentation in advertising, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45, 52-55 (1976), while the FDA's jurisdiction extends to misrepresentations on labels and
accompanying circulars. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1976). If the first agency's action fails, some courts
will apply collateral estoppel to an action by the second agency. See United States v. Willard
Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944); George H. Lee Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.
1940). But see note 73 infra. In recent years, FTC-FDA cases have virtually disappeared from
court dockets, presumably because an interagency liaison agreement restricts duplicative
proceedings against the same parties "to those highly unusual situations where it is clear that
the public interest requires two separate proceedings." Updated FTC-FDA Liaison Agree-
ment-Advertising of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9851 (Sept. 9,
1971) (updating Working Agreement Between FTC and FDA, id. at 9850.01, 9850.03 (June
9, 1954)). For an arguably "unusual situation," see Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 361 F. Supp.
948 (D.D.C. 1973).
72. E.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (second agency knew
of first agency's adjudicatory proceeding when it initiated its own investigation and could
have intervened in the first proceeding), vacated on rehearing en banc, 555 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 142-43 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (statutes and agencies had peculiarly close historical rela-
tionship). For an argument favoring a strong collateral estoppel doctrine at the investigatory
stage, see Note, Administrative Collateral Estoppel: The Case of Subpoenas, 87 YALE L.J.
1247 (1978).
73. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). For a similar view, see United States v. 42 Jars of Bee Royale Capsules, 264 F.2d 666,
669 (3d Cir. 1959). Judges have invoked a variety of reasons for rejecting collateral estoppel.
E.g., United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 352 (1959) (issues are not precisely the same); FTC
v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 878 (proceedings are still at investigatory stage); id. at 893
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (agency is exercising a legislative as opposed to an adjudicatory
function); United States v. 42 Jars of Bee Royale Capsules, 264 F.2d at 669 (prior proceeding
resulted in consent agreement); United States v. 3963 Bottles of Enerjol Double Strength,
265 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1959) (agencies acted under statutes with different purposes and
effects); United States v. Five Cases of Capon Springs Water, 156 F.2d 493, 495-96 (2d Cir.
1946) (findings in first proceeding did not favor the private party involved); United States v.
1 Dozen Bottles of Boncquet Tablets, 146 F.2d 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1944) (agencies seek different
forms of relief).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), supra note 11, at 350-53.
75. Id. at 350, No. 62 (J. Madison), at 418.
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ration of powers doctrine7" manifest an understanding that inter-
woven and competing redundancies check the concentration and
abuse of power.77 Though Publius looked to "dependence on the
people" as the primary control on government, he noted that
"experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau-
tions" that "so contriv[e] the interior structure of the government
as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations,
be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. ' 78 Multi-
agency decisionmaking speaks to these concerns.
Of the conceptual frameworks for analyzing political systems,
partisan mutual adjustment accords the greatest formal acceptance
to the values of agency redundancy. 79 According to this analysis
most politically feasible policy changes differ only incrementally
from existing policies. Decisions will not enjoy political acceptabil-
ity unless the policymakers grapple with the interests, values, and
arguments voiced by other policymakers, both government and non-
government. This constraint limits realistic options to those that
deviate only slightly from the status quo. Moreover, because exist-
ing policy reflects a previous adjustment of competing interests, any
new policy will likely include only modest change-barring a major
upheaval or reallocation of power among interested parties.
The incremental decisionmaking process also helps insure that
the decisionmakers act within their competence. The limitation of
incremental change discourages the policymaker from wandering
too far from familiar experience. It need not explore the entire uni-
verse of alternatives, but only those acceptable to the partisan mu-
tual adjustment system. This smaller universe limits the number
and complexity of factors in need of analysis. The incremental pro-
cess thus contrasts with a highly centralized system in which a few
interests dominate because of the diminished effectiveness of parti-
san checks. In the latter system, the number of policy alternatives
under consideration, the complexity of the process, and the proba-
bility of an unsatisfactory resolution all increase. The incremental
76. Id. No. 51 (J. Madison), at 348-49. Madison also recognized that as a practical
matter, the division of power would succumb to encroachments by the legislative branch
"unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give each a constitutional
control over the others . . . ." Id. No. 48, at 332.
77. Other redundancies in the national system include overlapping terms of office, the
Bill of Rights, the veto, the legislative override, and judicial review.
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), supra note 11, at 349, 347-48.
79. The model is developed in D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION
(1963); C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-
MAKING PROCESS (1968). The analytical mode serves as a foundation for an extensive inquiry
into political-economic systems in C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MAKErS (1977).
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model does not assume that all decisionmakers will aggressively
press their interests. One may defer to another's judgment out of
lack of interest or inadequate political power. The decisionmaker
has nevertheless chosen a method of adjustment that reflects its
values and the relative priority of its interests.
In the context of multiagency decisionmaking, the limitations
of incremental analysis create little difficulty. As critics charge,
partisan mutual adjustment does not necessarily assure high-
quality policy decisions or effective competition among partisan
interests with varying degrees of power. Some also doubt the practi-
cal value of so general a thesis; for example, the theory fails to
answer such concrete questions as how much partisanship and how
many decisionmakers are desirable in a given process. Because the
model seems to presume a high degree of social stability, observers
argue that it offers ideological reinforcement of the proinertia and
anti-innovative forces prevalent in organizations."0
Incrementalism, however, offers particular insight into the
administrative system where policy alternatives are far fewer than
for Congress or the Executive. Bounded by statutory mandates as
well as by limited resources, jurisdiction, and enforcement tools,
agencies are necessarily circumscribed in what they can do. An
agency can occasionally chance a precipitous shift in policy, but too
many ambitious moves invite a check from the constitutional
branches. Even major changes are frequently the product of a series
of incremental decisions." No general analysis promises firm diag-
noses or predictions about actual behavior, but insights into the
decisionmaking process on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the in-
cremental approach does not guarantee the substantive merit of
each decision; but the process constraints encourage competence in
decisionmaking. When a decision proves inadequate because higher
authority has failed to direct a desirable fundamental change in
policy, the agency's power to act in measured steps furnishes at least
the opportunity to deal with changing circumstances. Our focus on
multiple agency decisionmaking responds to concerns about the
model's bias toward social stability. Because one agency must at-
tend to the positions of overlapping and duplicative agencies, it
80. See Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED 143-47 (1968); A. ETzIONI, THE
ACTIVE SociEty 286-93 (1968); P. SELF, supra note 47, at 239-52; Etzioni, Mixed-Scanning: A
"Third" Approach to Decisionmaking, 27 PUB. AD. REv. 385 (1967); George, supra note 33,
at 760-61.
81. The FCC's periodic injections of competition into the common carrier industry offer
an illustration. For a brief history, see Sirico, Horse-Trading with Ma Bell: Who Benefits?,
in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN, 219, 220-24 (T. Haight, ed. 1979).
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must consider a broad range of alternatives and a wide variety of
interests.82 This consequence discourages the inertia typical in a
unitary agency with tunnel vision. Multiagency decisionmaking also
creates more points of access for partisan interests and may help
frustrate dominance by one particular interest. By emphasizing the
broadening function of partisan mutual adjustment, our argument
harmonizes legitimacy's concern for stability and the dynamic of
conflict.
Partisan mutual adjustment presents itself not as one possible
design, but as the inevitable design of the entire political system.
Attempts to thwart it with centralized, synoptic planning are
doomed, at least in the long run. Of course, unitary planning can
frustrate the system's self-adjustment for a considerable time, to the
benefit of those interest groups that stand to gain from the unad-
justed system. If the promise of ultimate adjustment becomes ex-
tremely remote, legitimacy suffers. The gravity of the imperfection,
however, varies with the degree of illegitimacy. If the status quo
causes only grumbling or passive resignation, the adjustment dy-
namic may come to a virtual standstill.
This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, the constraints
against nonevolutionary conduct encourage agencies to move incre-
mentally and to be sensitive to the concerns of other agencies and
82. Professor Etzioni proposes a "mixed scanning" model to combine the advantages
of incrementalism with the examination of fundamental decisions about the course of policy.
His approach calls for the incrementalist's detailed analysis of short-term, nonfundamental
options together with a general scanning of long-term consequences and policy implications.
ETzIONI, supra note 80, at 282-305. As Etzioni admits, however, "most incremental decisions
specify or anticipate fundamental decisions, and. . . the cumulative value of the incremental
decisions is greatly affected by the underlying fundamental decisions." Id. at 289. The larger
policy questions cannot help but inform the positions of partisan interests and decisionmak-
ers. Each decisionmaker, moreover, screens special interest arguments through a public inter-
est filter-though the filter's fineness may vary-which requires the perspective Etzioni em-
phasizes. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text. To the extent that agencies are
capable of fundamental decisions, the mixed scanning model simply articulates considera-
tions incorporated in partisan mutual adjustment at the administrative level.
This analysis also speaks to the so-called "tragedy of the commons." In utilizing a scarce
resource such as the environment, independent decisionmakers acting in a noncentralized
system may leave themselves each worse off than if they had engaged in collective determina-
tion. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Envi-
ronmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (applying the concept to federal and state agen-
cies). To the extent that decentralized decisionmaking at the federal level creates this risk,
the synoptic alternative offers no foolproof solution. The agency exercising ultimate power
may not reflect the maximizing consensus of the parties concerned. The promise and failings
of the unitary and mixed system models come into play. Without the consent of the governed,
the agency must either not exercise its authority or risk losing it. The decentralized alterna-
tive is an agency designed to advance the perceived common interest; it sets policies to further
its goal and to influence the result of the interagency process.
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the various affected interests. Second, if agencies adjust too slowly
to meet the significant demands of new interest groups and newly
dissatisfied interest groups, they impair their existing level of legiti-
macy.I
For the interest group, advocating the unitary ideals of a highly
centralized agency and rigid jurisdictional lines is a sometime tactic
to retain or gain an advantage. The assenting policymaker must
presume that the resulting imperfect system enjoys sufficient legiti-
macy to withstand serious criticism. Because the diminution of le-
gitimacy is such a subtle process in a stable society, this concern will
likely not receive direct attention. Instead, the analysis will assume
another form. In addition to appraising the substantive arguments
of the opposing interests, the policymaker will gauge the relative
satisfaction and dissatisfaction that the partisans will receive from
each option and assess the political power that they wield. The
decisionmakers will also weigh in the apparent efficiencies, that
stem from assigning "dispositive" decisional authority to a central-
ized agency. The inquiry, however, remains incomplete unless the
benefits of multiple agency decisionmaking and the mixed system
hybrid undergo examination. The investigation should include both
the general systems analysis just concluded and a close look at the
specific ways that multiagency activity can contribute to the quality
of decisionmaking.
D. Multiagency Decisionmaking
Assessing administrative structures requires measuring the po-
tential of each for economy, efficiency, and accuracy. At first glance,
the examination of unitary and multiagency processes seems to con-
trast the increased accuracy of the latter with the temporal and
economic efficiency of the former. The analysis, however, is more
complex.
Neither system can claim that it best satisfies the economy,
efficiency, and accuracy criteria in all cases. The multiagency pro-
cess suffers from dysfunctions that may impair the quality of its
product, and a unitary system is not necessarily less costly in time
or money. An unsatisfactory decision speedily reached may merely
launch a protracted effort at revision. It may also require a determi-
nation either to expend financial resources to undo the harm done
or to let society live with the costly error. Unitary structures can also
produce wasteful expense. Different agencies with differing tasks
may find themselves separately performing similar information
gathering and analysis functions and thus duplicating costs and
1980]
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avoiding economies of scale. Because the unitary approach fosters
giant agencies, it also risks intra-agency conflict and noncoordi-
nation that create diseconomies of scale.
83
A realistic analysis must therefore proceed on a case-by-case
basis. The next few pages provide guidance for this undertaking. To
counterbalance the bias favoring the unitary model, we examine the
functions that a multiagency system can perform and suggest the
circumstances in which it best performs them.
The decisionmaking process consists of four stages-gathering
information (including the arguments of different groups), analyz-
ing the problem in light of the information, making a decision, and
executing the decision. For our purposes, we can consolidate this
process into two stages-information-analysis and decision-
execution. In general, the multiagency method contributes most at
the former stage when the conflict potential among agencies is less
concrete. In contrast, the same approach frequently offers more as-
sistance at the decision-execution stage when the conflict potential
is more concrete.
The multiagency system can improve the information-analysis
process in at least four ways. First, conflicting preferences can moti-
vate an agency to develop information and arguments to defend its
choice. This activity can improve both the amount and quality of
the evidence presented. Second, an agency in disagreement with the
information and arguments of another agency is motivated to check
the quality of evidence that the opposing agency presents. Thus
conflicting agencies have a reciprocal incentive to develop high
quality grist for the decisional mill."4 Third, an opposing agency
must grapple not only with the evidence and arguments it might
likely have developed on its own, but also with data and positions
developed through the idiosyncratic system of another agency. An
agency's history, tradition, work methods and clientele as well as
the personality and style of its leadership can give to the evidence
and arguments a slant that would be hard to duplicate.85 Regardless
83. The problem of diseconomies of scale in agencies has received only limited recogni-
tion. E.g., SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 10; Schwartz, supra note 37,
at 1074.
84. See Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response,
16 NAT. REsOURCES J. 263, 286-88 (1976).
85. See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 41, at 24 (different executive agencies often have
different perceptions of the public interest); Murane, supra note 47, at 39-43 (in regulating
banking practices, the FDIC, SEC, and FTC are each primarily concerned with a different
segment of the public). See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKS 27-28 (1977) (describing the
characteristics of bureaucracy, which help furnish each agency with an individual identity).
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of the objective quality of the resulting idiosyncratic position, it
offers information and analysis that other agencies would not other-
wise have available. Fourth, the resulting multiplicity of developed
viewpoints compels each agency to recognize more fully the compet-
ing goals and diverse interests that are involved."6 In each of these
instances, the threat of blockage or strong interference spurs benefi-
cial effects. The power of other agencies intensifies the motivation
to develop unassailable arguments, to question the counterargu-
ments, and accordingly to pay greater heed to opposing positions.
In contrast, a unitary system runs a high risk of severely limit-
ing the decisional environment. As lower level staff members ana-
lyze data and distill opinions, they conduct a filtering process. Their
judgments determine which conflicts the higher authority will learn
about and how much the ultimate decisionmaker will know about
a conflict. To be sure, the unitary decisionmaker cannot help but
hear about the most volatile controversies and feel the pressure of
affected interests. That decisionmaker, however, may have less ac-
quaintance with more subtle conflicts and possess only a limited
knowledge of the various options for resolution. 7 In a multiagency
setting, however, the presence of other agencies serves as a potential
antidote to the filtering process.
At the decision-execution stage, the redundancy inherent in
multiagency decisionmaking also makes a fourfold contribution.
First, to the extent that agencies overlap, the chances increase that
at least one agency will perform the required task.88 The overlap
may even generate competition to perform. Second, an agency can
assume a specific task that another agency has wholly failed to
execute as part of its larger program; that is, one agency's activities
can compensate for defects in another agency's performance.
86. See Wichelman, supra note 84, at 286-88 (illustrations from environmental field).
See Kauper, supra note 41, at 26 (Antitrust Division's participation in administrative pro-
ceedings can broaden its expertise and make its vision less parochial).
87. See O'Riordan, Policy Making and Environmental Management: Some Thoughts
on Processes and Research Issues, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 62-63 (1976).
88. E.g., Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1084
(1971) (FTC challenged the merger of two drug manufacturers-one headed by a close friend
and campaign supporter of President Nixon-after Justice declined to contest it, despite the
advice of its own Antitrust Division chief).
89. E.g., Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice
and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAw. 2075, 2081 (1976)(intense rivalry for the
"best" cases even when agencies have formally divided their concurrent jurisdiction).
90. See, e.g., Volner, Getting the Horse Before the Cart: Identifying the Causes of
Failure of the Regulatory Commissions, 5 HOFsTRA-L. REV. 285, 294 (1977) (suggesting that
the FTC has more rigorous standards than the Postal Service in defining false and misleading




Third, redundancy implies that several agencies should be launch-
ing efforts aimed at the same goal. To the extent that the perform-
ance of the respective agencies shares a common perspective, they
send out to their specialized constituencies (whose number may
likely outnumber the constituencies of a unitary agency) a forceful
message on the status of government policy. Fourth, this multiplic-
ity of efforts by agencies with different styles and enforcement pow-
ers opens the possibility of numerous approaches to a problem. The
administrative system can thus acquire a portfolio of flexible re-
sponses."'
The impact of these positive effects varies according to the
concreteness of the potential agency conflict. On the matter of in-
suring performance, redundancy offers a greater safeguard if the
task in question is specific. Because an agency may choose among
many options in pursuing a less defined goal, the option selected by
one agency may not at all duplicate the options chosen by another
agency. The more specific the task is, the smaller is the universe of
options, and the chance of duplication increases. In like manner,
concreteness enhances the compensating effects of redundancy. As
for intensifying the policy message, agencies with a potential for
concrete conflict are more likely to engage in the same conduct and
send out the same message. Less concrete potential conflict will
likely lead to more ambiguous communication. Finally, no matter
how concrete or nonspecific the potential conflict may be, agencies
will develop a multiplicity of approaches. A more concrete potential
conflict, however, may generate solutions that are more readily in-
terchangeable among agencies.
At both the information-analysis and decision-execution
stages, one or more agencies may seek to avoid shared authority and
retain autonomy. Such conduct amounts to a dysfunctional circum-
vention of the multiple agency process. In collecting and evaluating
information, an agency may choose to bury internal conflict to in-
crease its decision's strength as perceived by the outside world. For
example, the agency may hide or distort information detrimental to
its chosen or predicted stance and may stifle contrary arguments
that deserve an airing. The burying mentality need not stem from
a conspiracy; the agency's natural desire for shared values and
group cohesiveness reinforces organizational consensus and narrow
91. The FTC's staff study on nutritional labeling argued that Commission inaction
would unfairly dilute the impact of the FDA's labeling rules and contravene a national public
policy favoring extensive labeling. 39 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1974). Dual agency action certainly
intensifies the message and puts the resources and enforcement tools of two agencies at the




At the decision-execution stage, agencies may avoid conflict by
negotiating a modus vivendi. Such an agreement may amount to an
abdication of jurisdiction or a deference in its exercise. Though the
agency may voice a thoughtful rationale for its concession-for ex-
ample, lack of expertise or resources 3-it still reduces the benefits
of the multiagency process. The deference arrangement may take
the shape of a formal liaison agreement, an ad hoc understanding,
or a unilateral determination." If the concurrent agency has already
set a policy course, including nonaction, the focal agency may treat
that policy as conclusive. It might instead accept as conclusive or
persuasive the concurrent agency's factual findings, analysis, or pol-
icy." If the concurrent agency has yet to formulate a policy or com-
plete the formulation, the focal agency may treat as conclusive or
persuasive whatever findings, analysis, or policy the former has for-
mulated.
As for the execution of a policy decision, a deferential agency
may adopt one of three courses. First, it may opt for a hands-off
position and rely on the concurrent agency to carry out whatever
policy it has formulated or is formulating. Second, it may pursue a
policy consonant with whatever policy or developing policy, analy-
sis, or factual findings the concurrent agency has developed." Fi-
92. See O'Riordan, supra note 87, at 62-63; text accompanying note 87 supra.
93. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 38, at 97-98 (stating that the Nuclear Regulatory
Ccmmission is ill-equipped to make environmental determinations about nuclear plant siting
and proposing that a specialized agency assume the task).
94. See, e.g., Updated FTC-FDA Liaison Agreement-Advertising of Over-the-Counter
Drugs, supra note 71; Kauper, supra note 41, at 17-19; Roll, supra note 89; Schwartz, supra
note 37. Conflicts, however, can arise even under a formal liaison agreement. Loosely drawn
jurisdictional lines may leave ample room for overlap; one agency may grow impatient wait-
ing for the other agency to implement an agreed-upon program; the competence and personal-
ities of the liaison officers may impede coordination; the liaison officer may lack authority to
commit the agency to a long range program, much less one coordinated with another agency;
or ad hoc communications may frustrate a continuing exchange of information. Competition
for the best cases, moreover, seems an inevitable phenomenon. See notes 89-91 supra and
accompanying text. Because liaison presumes a political consensus, it works best only on
mechanical, value-neutral matters. Lack of coordination has been characterized as an ac-
cepted Washington folkway. Robinson, supra note 21, at 954.
95. See, e.g., Keeffe & Head, supra note 39, at 798 n.56 (though the Federal Reserve
Board was aware of Franklin National Bank's weak condition, it accepted the Comptroller's
declaration of the bank's solvency and loaned it $1.7 billion prior to the final crisis).
96. A seriously detrimental form of deference can arise when a regulatee can choose
which agency will serve as its primary regulator-for example, a financial institution choosing
between the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller. If regulatees flock to the more
lenient regulator, then the stricter agency may feel pressure to shift policies and commence
a competition in laxity. See note 39 supra and accompanying text; SENATE REGULATORY
REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 208. Because the original disparity stemmed from a policy
disagreement, the "competition in laxity" is a form of deference that submerges conflict more
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nally, if the concurrent agency has yet to formulate a policy, the
focal agency may elect not to act in any way until the concurrent
agency has completed a formulation. 7 In this case, nonaction by the
concurrent agency will leave the ultimate task unpursued.9 5
Abdication and deferral in jurisdiction result in one agency's
assuming sole responsibility for the decision it makes; that is, the
administrative process drifts closer to the unitary model. This phen-
omenon illustrates the tension between the inclination to "pass the
buck" and the territorial imperative to retain jurisdiction. In these
instances, however, the agency need not forfeit jurisdiction. It in-
stead declines to exercise jurisdiction for the moment; as long as the
option to act remains, the turf is safe."
Though deference can impair the multiagency process, it can
also curb unproductive conflict. If deference stems from fear of fac-
ing a difficult issue or from insufficient interest or information to
make a thoughtful decision, it may merely frustrate the multi-
agency dynamic. If, however, it results because agencies share a
policy consensus or because one agency has assigned the issue a low
priority, then it eliminates needless steps in decisionmaking.
At the decision-execution stage, a second dysfunction may arise
when one agency can completely block another agency's action. The
blocking agency's veto power permits it to reject totally the policy
concerns voiced by significant societal interests. The check, how-
ever, may also accord with societal priorities. If, for example, two
agencies regulate a matter pertaining to health and safety, dual
jurisdiction may implement a conservative policy to ban from the
market items of potential risk.10 If, however, the vetoing agency's
policy is more conservative than societal values warrant, it may
deeply than perhaps either agency would like. An alternative strategy is to permit the stricter
agency to offer regulatees other rewards for not switching allegiance.
In a variation on the theme, a regulatee subject to dual enforcement agencies may
attempt to "pick" the agency that will handle its case. Reycraft, Dealing with Enforcement
Agencies Prior to Filing of Suit, 39 ANTrrRUST L.J. 174 (1970); Roll, supra note 89, at 2083.
97. See note 38 supra.
98. In a curious variation on these three courses, the FCC in 1976 adopted a policy of
referring to the FTC all cases involving "hypoing," a method of distorting audience ratings
and misleading advertisers. Docket 20501, 58 F.C.C.2d 513, 522 (1976). The deferring agency
had no reason to believe that the FTC would accept the task, because the FTC failed to
participate in the FCC proceeding and had previously indicated its disinterest. Closed Cir-
cuit, BROADCASTING, April 28, 1975, at 3. See Lee, The FCC and Regulatory Duplication: A
Case of Overkill?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 235, 242 (1975); Volner, supra note 90, at 294-95.
99. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 361 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1973) (separate
FTC and FDA proceedings, the former directed at Listerine and the latter at over-the-counter
drug remedies including Listerine, despite a liaison agreement restricting duplicative pro-
ceedings to "highly unusual situations"); note 71 supra.
100. See, e.g., note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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interfere with the needs of producers ' and consumers.10
Despite the benefits of the multiagency approach, the predispo-
sition toward linear thinking remains excessive. An underlying con-
cern with the more disorderly multiagency process may be a disin-
terest in long-term benefits when short-term alternatives seem read-
ily available. The unitary system's less perfect short-term solutions
produce at least the appearance of finality and, indeed, may prove
sufficiently satisfactory to satisfy concerns for legitimacy. Though
the multiagency process may offer ultimately more acceptable solu-
tions, it also creates opportunities for confusion stemming from pol-
icy conflicts and from breakdowns in mechanical cooperation and
information exchange. Administrative analysis must therefore grap-
ple with the crucial question: is the more discursive game worth the
candle?
In answering the question, the policymaker should note that a
redundant system's drawbacks may loom larger in theory than they
do in practice. In real life, the system may produce limited conflict.
Agencies have strong inclinations and incentives favoring defer-
ence. 03 Redundancy will create conflict when the overlapping agen-
cies lack a policy consensus or when the mechanical system for
exchanging interagency information seriously malfunctions. The
economic and political costs of duplicative effort check one agency
from challenging the policies of other agencies, except in serious
cases, and from excessively isolating itself from knowledge of other
101. The extensive political power of the food and drug industries makes this possibility
quite unlikely. See GREEN, supra note 25, at 102-46.
102. This chart summarizes the above discussion:
Information-Analysis Decision-Execution
Functions: Functions:
Advocacy motivation Increase chance of performance
Critical motivation Compensating performance
Idiosyncratic perspectives Intensify policy message
Awareness of diverse Multiplicity of approaches
interests
Dysfunctions: Dysfunctions:
Bury conflict Abdicate or defer jurisdiction
Veto competing concerns in
cases of concrete conflict
This analysis represents a first attempt at a systematic description of the multiagency
dynamic. It demonstrates that multiple agency activity employs three basic methods of social
control: exchange, authority (when concrete conflict allocates authority to the dominating
agency), and persuasion. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 85, at 12-13 (articulating the methods
of social control).
103. See notes 83-102 supra and accompanying text.
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agencies. Affected private parties provide another source of continu-
ing information about the activities of other agencies and the im-
pact of duplicative or conflicting proposals.' 4 The great danger may
be that bureaucratic inertia and the influence of affected interests
will impede the multiagency process in the performance of its bene-
ficial functions. The remedy may lie in increased redundancy.
IH. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGITIMACY
The delegation of authority and separation of powers doubtless
no longer pose serious judicial threats to agency activity. The fact
that they continue to generate considerable discussion,' 5 however,
suggests that we are fundamentally dissatisfied with judicial deci-
sions upholding the constitutionality of agency structure and con-
duct. In little more than the past decade, procedural due process has
joined the two doctrines as a third test of constitutional legitimacy.
Though the contours of the due process requirement remain the
subject of judicial debate, '0 the legislature has become the primary
arena for battles over the proper extent of procedural rights. The
administrative system rapidly adjusted itself, or was adjusted by
the courts, to the judicial demands of the developing principles, but
it still has not fully allayed our concerns about procedural fairness
and broad access to the decisionmaking process. 0
All three doctrines continue to raise questions of constitutional
legitimacy, because they ask how well the agencies fit into our polit-
ical structure. The demise of the judicial challenge symbolizes a
reduction in our uneasiness. Agency activity is sufficiently accepta-
ble so that we need not invoke the ultimate sanction of constitu-
tional invalidation. We nonetheless remain uncomfortable with the
agency's hybrid nature and its semi-independence from the two
principal sources of political authority-the constitutional branches
and the public. The three legal doctrines serve as guides in exploring
104. A recent, apparently spurious message about conflicting agency directives was
Sears, Roebuck & Company's suit against ten federal agencies for promulgating allegedly
inconsistent rules on equal employment opportunities. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney
General, 47 U.S.L.W. 2734 (D.D.C. May 15, 1979). See Sears Sues U.S. Over Job Bias Laws,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
105. See, e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
37-85 (1979).
106. See, e.g., id. at 593-724 (due process hearing rights).
107. The literature on this subject is voluminous and it would serve no purpose to
footnote these pages with lengthy citations to the standard cases and commentaries on well




uneasiness about agency legitimacy. As statements of judicial law,
they are both formalistic descriptions of a political process and
highly rational statements of acceptable normative behavior that
define the outer limits of permissible agency conduct. They may
also encourage structures and a political style sensitive to the de-
mands of political accountability.'
Examination of the doctrines yields three conclusions about
administrative legitimacy. First, we are concerned about the
agency's relationship with its sources of authority. The delegation
doctrine seeks to insure agency control by higher authority and due
process requirements intensify accountability to affected societal
interests. Second, we are concerned that agencies lack lateral legiti-
macy of the sort afforded by checks and balances among the consti-
tutional branches. An agency usually invokes this legitimacy only
indirectly; each branch exercises power over the agency and, as a
consequence, over the other branches that use the agency as their
instrumentality. Similarly, various interest groups use the agency
forum to do battle and prevent an adversary from gaining excessive
influence. Finally, we are concerned that agencies will stray too far
from the political mainstream.
This concern pinpoints the underlying purpose of checks, bal-
ances, and accountability to authority-to insure that adjusting
mechanisms keep agencies in line with the dynamic norm of accept-
able conduct. This purpose highlights the stabilizing quality of le-
gitimacy. The analogy to feudal theory is not inapposite. The social,
political, economic, and legal relationships that characterized the
feudal pyramid were designed to create a well-integrated society
and assure nondisruptive behavior by the king's tenants and sub-
tenants. In the same manner, the three constitutional doctrines,
broadly viewed, weave a web of relationships that safely integrates
agencies into the political structure.
The appearance of stability enhances the agency's role. The
trust that it generates justifies broader independence. Interdepend-
ence with the constitutional branches also develops as the agency's
policy judgments and expert determinations receive deferential
treatment. The agency consequently gains an internal legitimacy
that defines it as more than an instrumentality of political authori-
108. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 85, at 126-30 (constitutionalism is a method for
curbing authority and introducing some forms of popular control by imposing four constraints
on authority-private property rights, specific definitions of broad authority, separation of
powers, and checks and balances); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONsTrruLONAL LAW § 5-17, at 288




ties. Agencies have significantly satisfied the demands of the three
constitutional doctrines and gained the deference due stable institu-
tions. Their task lies in enhancing rather than establishing legiti-
macy. Agencies may find additional support by invoking a macro-
view of the administrative system, since interaction of agencies,
even when adversarial, helps validate the entire administrative sys-
tem as well as the individual agencies. We now examine the preced-
ing statement, first from the focal agency's standpoint and then
from the administrative system's standpoint. The three constitu-
tional doctrines serve as the focal points of analysis.
A. Delegation
An agency need no longer fear a judicial determination that
Congress has delegated excessive power to it.' It must, however,
remain sensitive to the concerns underlying the constitutional dele-
gation doctrine. The policy issues raised are very much alive in
debates over the breadth and specificity that a legislative mandate
should provide. Some critics argue that mandates with vague lan-
guage about the public interest give the agency virtually no guid-
ance and hand to the recipient a controversy that the legislature was
unwilling or unable to resolve. According to this view, Congress not
only relinquishes control over policy choices, but also fails to set
criteria for appraising administrative performance. Other commen-
tators maintain that broad mandates are inevitable if agencies are
to respond to ever-changing needs and circumstances. They also
question whether guidelines with the least degree of flexibility will
constrict the discretion of an agency intent upon expanding its au-
thority. At the judicial level, these concerns arise when a court
determines whether or not an agency has acted within statutory
bounds.
The nonconstitutional debates over the propriety of delegation
go to the question of political accountability. If agencies have unbri-
dled discretion or even very broad discretion, perhaps narrowed by
self-imposed regulations and guidelines, they may prove insuffi-
ciently accountable to the sources of their authority. Multiple
agency interaction can strengthen the administrative system's re-
sponse to the delegation challenge. In the decisionmaking process,
the focal agency must deal with the information, policies, and argu-
ments of other agencies. It thus encounters expressions of multiple
109. But see, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-




policies and mandates from political authorities to the administra-
tive system. New directives to other components of the administra-
tive system help keep the focal agency politically current. The focal
agency's ultimate decision can therefore claim legitimacy not just
from the authority specifically delegated to it, but also from the
authority delegated to other participant agencies, and can invoke
congressional and executive mandates to the administrative system
as a whole. At this abstract level, the agency pieces together require-
ments and guidance from pertinent expressions of political will.
Not only must the focal agency attempt to harmonize inconsist-
ent and even conflicting statements of authority, it must also deal
with them as other agencies interpret them. Other agencies engaged
in a similar undertaking might well arrive at a different conclusion.
Much like judicial efforts at statutory construction, the results are
imprecise and the process can become bewildering.
The administrative process, however, is far more challenging
than its judicial counterpart. The focal agency must grapple with
disparate directives in a highly charged decisional environment.
Given the limited scope of judicial review, a court can claim legiti-
macy if it backs its decision with reasoning consistent with accepted
legal principles and precedents. Such facially neutral and rational
judgments, however, are insufficient for the agency. An administra-
tive decision must deal directly with value laden policy considera-
tions and political realities. Its legitimacy is therefore more vulnera-
ble to challenge. By giving good faith consideration to the argu-
ments of sister agencies, however, the focal agency claims a broader
base of authority for its decision. Thus, the legitimacy of an agency
decision derives from delegations to the administrative system as a
whole. Unlike the judiciary, however, the focal agency need not
pretend that its deliberations discern a unitary legislative intent.
Instead, the agency must determine how other directives support or
contravene its interpretation of its own mandate-it must find legis-
lative "sense" rather than legislative "intent" or "purpose."
The delegation argument takes on interesting dimensions when
the focal agency's particular mandate is unhelpfully vague on a
given issue and the mandates of participating agencies suffer the
same infirmity. Broad delegation burdens an agency with a task
impossible to perform and leaves it extremely vulnerable to criti-
cism. Reconciling policy expressions emanating from uninformative
mandates is a highly fictive exercise and therefore may further legit-
imacy in only a limited way. In these situations, however, even the
minimal information provided becomes enormously helpful. Per-
haps the very fact that Congress created another agency with over-
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lapping jurisdiction is telling. Though the latter agency's mandate
may lack specificity, its very existence requires the focal agency to
act with an awareness that Congress wanted the administrative
system to give consideration to a particular matter. The focal
agency can thus rely on a structural determination by the political
branches and claim a sort of "second best" legitimacy.
The political context of the administrative system strengthens
the argument. In the absence of competing mandates, agency posi-
tions stem from special interest pressures, historical factors, bureau-
cratic tradition, reflections on the findings of agency experts, and
like considerations. The agency must rely heavily on these factors
to define its mission. In commissioning a broad mandate, the politi-
cal authorities display trust in the agency to set a policy course by
these lights. The trust, however irresponsibly placed, becomes a
source of legitimation. Moreover, to the extent that the agency re-
flects the concerns of its regulatees and those affected by its regula-
tory activities, it demonstrates a direct political accountability to
society and enhances its own legitimacy. Thoughtful interaction
with other agencies further legitimates the decision by creating an
indirect accountability to the constituencies of the participating
agencies.
B. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers doctrine exercises a limited judicial
check on the administrative system. Courts have consistently recog-
nized that agencies are a permissible blending of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial functions. As the Federalist explains, separation
of powers is a general principle rather than a requirement of neat,
exclusive categorization."10 Once an agency receives delegated au-
thority,"' however, the three constitutional branches must respect
the separations doctrine as they interact with the agency."' Thus,
President Roosevelt discovered that he could not fire a member of
the Federal Trade Commission without infringing upon Congres-
sional rights;" 3 and Congress discovered that it could not appoint
members to the Federal Election Commission."4 The mix of interac-
tions and checks permits each branch to perform its functions and
110. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 11, at 325. Madison argues
that some blending of powers is necessary to generate the checks and balances that control
and maintain separate constitutional branches. Id. Nos. 47-48.
111. E.g., J. Freedman, supra note 6, at 93-94; Wright, supra note 21.
112. E.g., 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 152-57 (2d ed. 1978);
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1693-97.
113. Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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to restrain the others from overreaching."15
The concerns underlying the separations doctrine emerge in the
political struggle that Congress and the Executive wage to control
various agencies. In recent years, the. two branches have intensified
the debate over the benefits of two contrasting organizational struc-
tures-the independent regulatory commission and the executive
agency. Each branch claims advantages for the structure that would
theoretically award it the greater control."6 Congress, for example,
has recently favored the independent commission in structuring
such new governmental agencies as the Consumer Product Safety
Commission," 7 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, " and
the Federal Election Commission."' Illustrations of executive efforts
at aggrandizement include use of the Office of Management and
Budget to control not only general agency spending, but agency
policy.'20 An intriguing compromise is the Department of Energy,
which houses not only executive agencies but the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, which was designed as an independent
commission at congressional insistence.' 2'
Whether one organizational format is more politically account-
able than the other remains highly uncertain.'2 2 Some authorities
even suggest that Congress may not enjoy more control over inde-
pendent agencies than it possesses over executive bodies.' 23 The res-
olution of these questions is not crucial to the present inquiry. The
perceptions and conduct of each constitutional branch manifest
concern with acquiring and retaining power and checking the other
branches. The debate over organizational structure symbolizes the
separations dynamic.
115. The independence of agencies from the political process was a theme of the Pro-
gressive and New Deal eras. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 59-62.
116. Recent studies include the ASH REPORT, supra note 61 (arguing for greater Execu-
tive control) and the SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60 (arguing the benefits
of the independent structure).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25
(1972).
118. 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C.), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 94-16, 89 Stat. 77 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 6j, 18 (1976)); see S. REP. No. 1131, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5861-62.
119. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-439c (1976). The FEC was designed as something of a hybrid.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). On Congress' organizational preference, see
SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 25-39.
120. See SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 43-54; see note 21 supra.
121. See Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure,
30 AD. L. REv. 193, 234-35 (1978).
122. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 6, at 1404 & n.28, 1410 & n.48; Robinson, supra
note 21, at 952-53.
123. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 112, § 2:9, at 92-95 (1978).
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The congressional-executive struggle similarly affects the legiti-
macy of administrative action. If an agency is very accountable to
one branch and barely accountable to the other, the policy underly-
ing the separations doctrine renders it vulnerable to challenge. The
slighted branch may emphasize that the doctrine not only protects
the independence of each branch, but also enables one branch to
check the excesses of the other. An agency excessively beholden to
one branch weakens the check. Because an agency blends the pow-
ers of all three branches, it wields enormous power and requires
checks. An agency of limited accountability therefore threatens the
constitutional system. On a practical level, the branch that feels
slighted will aggressively exercise whatever controls it possesses and
even create new controls, or perhaps a competing governmental
body. Examples include the Executive's use of the former Office of
Telecommunications Policy to influence communications deci-
sions' 4 and the continuing congressional trend authorizing indepen-
dent commissions to conduct their own litigation instead of relying
upon the Justice Department."5
By making decisions with the participation of other agencies, a
focal agency can undermine such attacks. Each agency's policy can
claim authorization from different mixes of legislative and executive
mandates. By dealing with the positions and policies of other agen-
cies, the focal agency gains a broader base of support. To the extent
that the political branches exercise checks on the participating
agencies, they guard against excesses that the focal agency's
blended power might permit. The aggregate checks and balances
will probably not reflect an ideal mix of legislative and executive
power. The separations doctrine, however, does not require a perfect
balancing of the branches, but instead seeks to prevent excesses by
one branch. Multiagency participation should furnish enough
checks to thwart extremes.
This argument may seem highly artificial. In practice, however,
it has some persuasive value. If an executive-oriented agency re-
flects executive sentiments, it furnishes the Executive a vehicle to
influence the decision of an agency with a congressional orienta-
tion. 25 The latter agency can then argue that it has considered the
124. See Lee, supra note 98, at 246-49.
125. See SENATE REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 60, at 58-62, 63-67.
126. The most active executive intervenor has probably been the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division. See Hearings on H.R. 39 Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly & Commer-
cial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 189-214 (1975) (letter
of Thomas E. Kauper) (list of Antitrust Division's filings in regulatory agency proceedings
to date). Different departments of the Executive will sometimes participate in the same
regulatory proceeding and present divergent views. Kauper, supra note 41, at 24 n.52.
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executive agency's position and perhaps modified its decision in
response. The claim of broadly based decisionmaking thus leaves
the agency less assailable.
C. Procedural Due Process
The growth of procedural due process safeguards points toward
a "legislative model" or "interest representation model," which val-
idates agency conduct by affording affected interests representation
in the formal decisional process.12 Broad congressional delegations
to agencies may short circuit the process of interest accommodation
that lawmaking entails.' A legislative model of administrative de-
cisionmaking helps compensate for the loss by making the inter-
ested public a source of political legitimacy.'29 This benefit arises
whether increased access to the process generates a new systems
model or whether it simply furnishes another way to increase ad-
ministrative accountability.
The legislative model reflects numerous developments in ad-
ministrative law. Procedural safeguards, standing, attorneys' fees,
extensive notification procedures, and freedom of information and
sunshine laws encourage decisionmakers to give a fair hearing to all
interested parties and carefully consider the information and argu-
ments they offer. 30 In addition to contributing to the quality of the
decision, interest group participation provides a safety valve for the
dissatisfied and increases society's sense of control over the pro-
cess.'
These developments, however, fail to furnish a basis for unas-
sailable legitimacy. At best, the public has the opportunity to put
127. The idea is developed in Stewart, supra note 6; see note 16 supra.
128. See L. TRIBE, supra note 108, § 5-17, at 288.
129. In sharp contrast, New Deal theory denominated expertise and political independ-
ence as compensatory substitutes for political accountability. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at
76.
130. Dean Freedman attributes the rise in trial-type administrative procedures to the
increased need for confidence in government fairness in an era of heightened social conflict
marked by the deceptions and misjudgments of the nation's actions in Vietnam, public
distress with bureaucratic insolence, and mistrust of administrative expertise. J. FREEDMAN,
supra note 6, at 27-28, 47.
131. Studies in social psychology suggest that the perception of control over a source of
psychological stress helps limit the negative effects of stress. Broadened participation in the
administrative process may help increase satisfaction by offering a feeling of control over
bureaucracy, a source of stress. Empirical studies, however, yield varying conclusions. See
DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empirical Find-
ings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409, 433-34 &
nn.123-26. But see C. LINDBLOM, supra note 85, at 201-33 (arguing that business uses
polyarchical rhetoric and class indoctrination to continue its control of the political-economic
system, primarily on the grand issues).
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forth its views, but it exercises no decisive check on the agency's
ultimate decision. Perhaps the record the parties build may circum-
scribe the judicially acceptable options available to the agency, but
a rather expansive universe of possible solutions will remain. If the
affected parties dislike the final decision, their recourse is to Con-
gress and the Executive. Direct political accountability is thus
severely limited.
The additional public accountability runs not to the entire so-
ciety, but only to those directly interested parties with the focused
interest, resources and legal authority to exert influence. To argue
that procedural developments enhance the legitimacy of agency
decisions requires indulging in two presumptions: that agencies
have traditionally permitted certain powerful societal interests to
unduly influence their decisions, and that increased representation
of other interests helps counteract this bias and renders agency
decisions more acceptable to the range of societal interests. These
presumptions are not without support.'32 To the extent they are
accurate, increased participation enhances legitimacy not only by
checking unacceptable agency conduct, but also by affirmatively
promoting acceptable conduct.' 33
The contribution of broadened participation to agency legiti-
macy remains largely unrealized. The vehicles for increasing access
to the process are limited, and the resources of many would-be
participants are even more limited. On the judicial front, the proce-
dural revolution seems to be winding down, as evidenced by Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society'34 and Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., ,15
and the battle has shifted to Congress and, in some cases, to the
agencies as well. In these latter arenas, developments have been
remarkably modest. New bills occasionally offer the promise of at-
torneys' fees or extensive procedural safeguards for an administra-
tive activity, but any sort of across the board legislation languishes
in the hopper. As for the agencies, few have moved aggressively.' 3
132. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 18, at 165-205 (describing the
success of public interest lawyers in a variety of areas); Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 258-64
(case studies indicate that due process can contribute significantly to administrative imple-
mentation of substantive health care legislation); C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF
DEMOCRACY 300-02(1965).
133. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 6 (fair and efficient procedures that are responsive
to democratic values and constitutional restraints are a major source of administrative legiti-
macy).
134. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
135. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
136. One difficulty is the agency's uncertain authority to grant financial assistance to
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Yet, even if legislative and administrative proposals encountered
smashing success, the legislative model would still not reach full
flower. Traditionally underrepresented groups would remain under-
represented because their interests are diffused and unorganized
and because they lack adequate resources to make their voices
heard.' No government support program would truly equalize pol-
itical power. To document the permanence of inequality, we need
only look to the source of the legislative model-Congress itself.
There, where standing and procedural roadblocks do not discrimi-
nate against any particular interest group, financial resources read-
ily translate into effective representation. Dedication, enthusiasm
and persuasive ability by less affluent forces can make up only so
much of the difference. Full realization of the legislative model
therefore requires greater representation of a greater variety of inter-
ests than seems likely to occur.
These limitations aside, public interest groups and other spe-
cial interests do not necessarily indicate their priorities in selecting
the proceedings to which they devote their limited resources. Differ-
ent types of proceedings require different types of commitments. A
group, for example, may be concerned with the anticompetitive
effects of a corporate reorganization. It may, however, forego a chal-
lenge because participation would consume resources that could
yield greater impact if spent on less demanding, lower priority pro-
jects. No invisible hand insures that groups with limited resources
will distribute their efforts in direct proportion to the relative im-
portance an issue holds for them. 38
Given this state of affairs, agencies can play an important role
in broadening participation by representing interests hitherto un-
derrepresented in a given decisionmaking process. An agency might
voice the private interests of its regulatees before another agency.
An agency, however, plays a more significant role in vitalizing the
legislative model when it represents the interests of traditionally
underrepresented groups. The Antitrust Division, for example, po-
lices agency proceedings where it is concerned about the possible
anticompetitive effects of an agency decision. 3 ' The Division has
intervenors without specific congressional direction. See Greene County Planning Board v.
FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)(denying financial
assistance absent specific legislation); United States Chambers of Commerce v. Department
of Agriculture, 47 U.S.L.W. 2261 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1978) (an agency may have implied statu-
tory authority to fund public participation).
137. See Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 246 n.8.
138. See note 13 supra (an unacceptably narrow range of administrative choices under-
mines legitimacy).
139. See note 126 supra.
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the expertise, resources, and focused interest to make the sort of
case that would be impossible for traditionally underrepresented,
diffused groups to maintain. Thus, the Division's participation en-
hances the legitimacy of the process by making it more pluralistic.
The thrust of the ill-fated Consumer Protection Agency pro-
posal was to create a government instrumentality to represent un-
derrepresented public interests. 40 Denied this resource, these inter-
ests must continue to rely heavily upon existing agencies for surro-
gate representation.' 4'
The result of multiagency participation, however, is still an
imperfect pluralism. Accommodating a larger welter of competing
interests does not necessarily maximize the legitimacy of govern-
ment policy. We must still presume, then, that in today's world,
movement toward the legislative model increases legitimacy.'42
D. The Three Doctrines and the True Multiagency Model
The preceding discussion examines decisionmaking by the focal
agency in a "mixed system" model. Its analysis, however, also ex-
tends to the true multiagency model, where the final decision is not
the product of one agency but the in-process, aggregate product of
many agencies. Applying the analysis requires no rigor. In terms of
the delegation argument, authority granted to the agencies helps
validate the system's composite result. The separation of powers
doctrine assumes a stronger role because the checks and balances
of all the relevant agencies come into play, not just those of agencies
consulted by a focal agency. As for the benefits of procedural due
process, an increased legitimacy derives from the aggregation of
societal groups whose interests are reflected in the decisions of the
relevant agencies.
In theory, application of constitutional analysis to the true mul-
tiagency model would seem to make the arguments supporting that
model quite forceful because broad agency interaction weaves a
richly textured relationship to the sources of legitimacy. Yet it is
difficult to state the arguments in conventional political language
when we speak about the validity of the entire administrative sys-
tem. We may persuasively argue, for example, that a focal agency
seriously considers the positions of other agencies and therefore the
140. *See Speaker Calls Off Consumer Agency Vote, 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 436 (1977).
141. Some agencies have consumer advocacy offices, but many have only information-
oriented consumer assistance offices. See, e.g., B. COLE & M. OETTINGER, RELUCTANT REGULA-
TORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE 74-76 (1978); Shulman, Is Structural and Proce-
dural Change a Better Answer for Consumers Than the "Reform" of Abolishing the FCC?,
in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN, supra note 81, at 82-83; note 23 supra.
142. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
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interests to which the latter are particularly sensitive. It is less
persuasive, however, to contend that the end product of serial ad-
ministrative decisions reflects the concerns of many interests and
therefore closely approximates society's wishes.
The paradox lies in our perception of agencies as separate enti-
ties rather than as parts of an administrative process. In part, the
perception has historical roots. Agencies have taken birth one at a
time to deal with specific issues. Resolution of an agency conflict
therefore seems to be a matter of eliminating duplication and coor-
dinating irreducible overlap. As a result, we rarely view agencies as
supporting or checking each other's conduct, much less as creating
a system. This perception also stems from our tendency to focus on
individual agencies as decisionmakers rather than on an abstract
system. In contrast, however, virtually any grade school student
readily comprehends the entire government system as an entity and
also as three branches. The idea of checks and balances among the
branches is so understandable that the student can visualize not
only the parts and the abstract whole, but also the relationships
among them.
Why does such abstract thinking come easily at the constitu-
tional level, but not at the administrative level? The answer is
threefold: we have learned to teach the constitutional arrangement
effectively; we can easily perceive the federal government, but not
the administrative system, as a single entity; and we have not cre-
ated graphic symbols for agency interactions, as we have for the
analogous constitutional checks and balances.
The interrelationship of the three constitutional branches is not
only an integral part of our government, but is also an integral part
of our popular political self-image. We therefore inculcate the con-
cept from grade school and have acquired the ability to teach it well.
The concept lends itself to easy instruction. Government seems so
remote that we are comfortable in seeing it first as an entity before
we break it down into its components. With agencies, however, it is
easy to think first of the individual agency, but difficult to then
grasp the abstract notion of an administrative system.
Checks and balances among the constitutional branches also
lend themselves to easy teaching. For example, the student can
readily grasp the structural significance of a veto or of a court's
striking down a statute or executive order. Such actions, of course,
are not the sole methods of rejection, and they do not have the
finality they imply. They are, however, serviceable shorthand de-
scriptions. The popular definitions of checks and balances thus
serve as concrete symbols for a range of subtle yet direct interrela-
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tionships. The relationships among agencies, however, lack analo-
gous symbols and are therefore harder to teach. For example, when
one agency opposes another through conflicting regulation or policy,
the student views the move not as a veto, but as a conflict that
perhaps narrows the consequences of the other agency's action.
Though an executive veto may also be an inconclusive event, its
symbolic finality possesses a graspable concrete quality that an in-
teragency confrontation lacks. The lack of administrative symbols
likewise afflicts the ultimate product of the agency process, so that
we perceive a jumble of agency policies rather than a single ongoing
event.
Society's ability to change its perception of agency activity
seems highly questionable. Be that as it may, arguments favoring
the multiagency model exercise more force in specific, concrete
cases than they do in the abstract. Such arguments, for example,
might have an impact when a legislative or executive reorganization
proposal seeks to entrust to a single agency the jurisdiction that
several agencies currently share. One illustration might be the peri-
odic attempts to deprive the FTC of the antitrust enforcement au-
thority it shares with the Justice Department.4 3 The arguments
might also play a role in restructuring agency relationships to gain
linear efficiency and to foster creative tension, as exemplified by the
recent decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, an
independent agency, within the Department of Energy, a Cabinet
office.' In these cases, the advocate and the decisionmaker can
readily perceive how a decentralized structure offers more access
points for influence from the constitutional branches and from in-
terest groups, and thus furnishes the lateral checks and balances
that bind administrative policy to contemporary political norms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the political science and constitutional analyses that we
have undertaken focus on the gap between myth and reality in the
administrative system. The myth of the unitary ideal generates pol-
itical science prescriptions for abolishing administrative duplication
and overlap in the name of efficiency. Our incremental analysis
suggests that in reality the prescription can never be filled. In many
cases, moreover, the construction of rigid jurisdictional lines inter-
feres with sound decisionmaking. Our constitutional analysis ex-
plores the uneasy legitimacy of the administrative process. It ig-
143. See, e.g., Weston, A Merger of the Trustbusters?, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977, § 3,
at 18, col. 3.
144. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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nores the myth that only the direct controls of the constitutional
branches assure legitimacy and it demonstrates how interaction in
the multiagency system promotes acceptable conduct by the agen-
cies.
Both analyses advance the structural solution of the multi-
agency model, perhaps because they share an appreciation of group
interaction. Because of this appreciation, our political science anal-
ysis would remove impediments to natural interactions in a pluralis-
tic society, and our constitutional analysis would give greater play
to interactive mechanisms already at work in the political process.
These arguments are quite conservative in that they call for greater
reliance on accepted conduct and principles already at work in the
administrative system as well as most other political, social, and
economic arenas. 45
Despite the conservative nature of the arguments, multiagency
activity promises a profound impact on the administrative process.
A highly legitimated process offers greater freedom to the partici-
pants, and multiple agency participation expands the opportunity
for previously underrepresented groups to influence decisions. Legi-
timation thus does not constrain the administrative system, but
actually energizes it by invigorating the dynamic of social change.
145. Professor Wildavsky makes a related point by noting that democracy is less con-
cerned with avoiding error than with detecting and correcting error. His three criteria for
evaluating institutions are the ability to reverse actions, the possession of diverse sources of
ideas, and accountability for conduct. Wildavsky, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 217, 232-33
(1978). In focusing on accountability, we have argued that a multiagency system may enhance
the qualities of reversibility and diversity. The administrative process therefore employs
qualities inherent in democratic thinking and structures. Professor Wildavsky would not rely
on bureaucracy as the primary guardian of democracy. Id. at 234. Nor would 1.
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